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The former Director-General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency – Mohamed ElBaradei – once 
stated that the dissemination of sensitive parts of the 
nuclear fuel cycle is the Achilles’ heel of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.1 The vulnerability of the 
regime lies on the fine line between nuclear power 
plants and nuclear weapons. Both use the same raw 
materials. The fuel cycle behind peaceful uses can 
be diverted to feed military purposes.2 At each stage 
of the cycle (otherwise, the production of fresh fuel, 
uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and 
the ultimate disposal of nuclear waste) there is a 
breach where fissile material used for electricity can 
be diverted to build a warhead. This is behind the 
ambiguity between peaceful and military ends, where 
a “commercial fuel-making facility represents a latent 
nuclear bomb”.3 Therefore, the Achilles’ heel of non-
proliferation is the dual-use of nuclear materials. The 
dilemma is to maintain effective oversight over global 
fuel-cycles, whilst recognizing the right of countries 
to develop their own nuclear capacity. 
Such oversight has been challenging already, but 
its prospects for the future might reserve even more 
daunting results. Considering the expected global 
expansion of the nuclear power sector in the next 
few decades, the vulnerability of the non-proliferation 
regime tends to be more exposed. Safeguards and 
export control mechanisms are currently strained 
and have proven to have limited effectiveness against 
clandestine programmes – as the cases of North Ko-
rea, Iran and Libya demonstrate. Even more rigorous 
inspections established by IAEA’s Additional Protocol 
face logistical constraints. Besides, the Protocol itself 
was ratified in less than half of IAEA member-States 
and still fails to be a strong international instrument.4 
Hence, as Deutch argues, “there is the widespread 
concern that, even with such measures, proliferation 
risks will not be reduced to acceptable levels in face 
of substantial global growth in nuclear fuel-cycle 
deployment”.5 
In order to strengthen the non-proliferation 
regime, there are renewed calls for establishing ad-
ditional mechanisms such as Multilateral Nuclear Ap-
proaches (MNAs). Its concept involves multinational 
arrangements to control centres for the enrichment 
and reprocessing of nuclear fuel.6 In practice, MNAs 
can offer a variety of alternatives, ranging from 
multilateral assurances of fuel supply, joint owner-
Multilateral Nuclear Approaches: Do they provide a credible 
solution to non-proliferation challenges posed by the expected 
global expansion of the nuclear power sector?
Abordagens Nucleares Multilaterais: Será que elas provêem uma 
solução credível aos desafios de não-proliferação atômica devidos 
à expansão do setor de energia nuclear?
RODRIGO P. MOREIRA PENNA* 
Meridiano 47 vol. 11, n. 118, mai. 2010 [p. 15 a 22]
* Mestre em ‘Conﬂ ito, S egurança e Desenvolvimento’ pela Universidade de Londres e Coordenador de Cooperação 
Internacional do Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ (rodrigo.penna@kcl.ac.uk).
1  IAEA, 2005, p.17 
2  Wolfsthal, 2004a, p.2 
3  Ferguson, 2007, p.16 
4  ‘Status of Additional Protocols’, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html, 07 Apr.2009. 
5  Deutch et al., 2005, p.68 
6  Wilson, 1979, p.252 




ship of nuclear facilities, as well as comprehensive 
arrangements dividing global suppliers and costum-
ers of nuclear fuel.7 However, despite the existence 
of concrete multinational arrangements so far, they 
face critical limitations to meet non-proliferation chal-
lenges. The current expansion of the nuclear power 
sector further strains the effectiveness of MNAs, and 
thus, their own credibility. 
This article maintains that these limitations are 
particularly true regarding comprehensive MNAs – 
such as establishing closed groups of nuclear suppliers 
and proposals for fuel leasing (or ‘cradle-to-grave’ 
arrangements). By contrasting their benefits and 
limitations, this article concludes that comprehen-
sive MNAs have restricted feasibility, thus lacking the 
necessary effectiveness against the risks associated 
with the global expansion of nuclear power. Instead, 
simpler, regional, multilayered and non-discriminatory 
arrangements could offer a more credible non-prolif-
eration recourse in addition to existing mechanisms. 
This discussion proceeds in three parts. First, this ar-
ticle identifies the main proliferation risks associated 
with the expansion of the nuclear energy market. 
Second, comprehensive MNAs are assessed in light 
of their benefits and limitations to curb proliferation 
risks. And finally, the third part concludes on the lack 
of credibility of comprehensive MNAs vis-à-vis the 
non-proliferation regime and the global expansion 
of nuclear power. 
Nuclear Energy Expansion: 
What are the challenges?
This decade has been witnessing a rebirth of 
nuclear energy. After the late 1970s, there was a sharp 
drop in the commissioning of nuclear power plants 
(NPPs) as a negative response towards the accidents 
at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The political 
blow against nuclear energy influenced the U.S. not 
to order any new reactor for almost three decades 
since the late 1970s8. With the exception of France, 
Western Europe turned its back on nuclear power – 
most notably Italy, Sweden and Germany.9 Hence, it 
is not surprising to find that “about three quarters 
of all reactors in operation today are over 20 years 
old”.10 As of the end of 2007, “439 nuclear reactors 
were operating in 30 countries, corresponding to 
14% of the global electricity generation”.11 Neverthe-
less, according to the IAEA, at least 44 new NPPs are 
under construction, 64 have been commissioned and 
158 have been proposed to meet long-term energy 
demands.12 These numbers, even if in high projec-
tions, show a reversal of the downward trend of NPP 
commissioning. 
Besides the growth in the number of reactors, 
more countries are adopting nuclear energy capability 
for the first time. New NPPs were announced in Turkey, 
Indonesia, Vietnam,13 and over 43 countries have 
formally expressed their interest to participate in IAEA 
technical cooperation projects for the introduction of 
nuclear power.14 Moreover, several other countries – 
including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Africa and 
Ukraine – are advancing their indigenous enrichment 
capability as a way to master the nuclear fuel-cycle in 
a commercial scale.15 
Some explanations are offered to understand the 
possible drivers behind the expansion of the nuclear 
power sector and how such expansion could either 
favour or hinder multilateral nuclear approaches. 
Grimston suggests that any energy supply must meet 
at least four criteria: security and reliability; low costs; 
manageable environmental impact; and social and 
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political acceptability. Compared to other sources, 
nuclear energy hardly managed to meet those criteria 
in the last decades of the 20th century. As mentioned 
before, two nuclear accidents affected social and 
political acceptability of NPPs, besides the popular 
perception on their environmental damage. In terms 
of costs, fossil fuels (particularly oil and natural gas) 
were more competitive due to low prices and to the 
discovery of new reserves. Therefore, in terms of en-
ergy security, the world of the 1990s faced a period 
of comfort even in face of a declining share of nuclear 
power in the global energy mix.16 
The upsurge of nuclear power in the later years 
could be explained by how such variables have 
changed in light of Grimston’s criteria. In terms of en-
vironmental impact, popular perception has focused 
more on global warming. Ironically, nuclear power 
has emerged as the apparent solution to the burning 
of fossil fuels, thus giving an alternative to countries 
– such as Canada – to meet carbon emission targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol.17 Moreover, relative costs 
and reliability of NPPs have changed. The volatility of 
oil and gas prices in the later years contributed to a 
degree of uncertainty. Dependency on Middle-Eastern 
and Russian reserves has proven to be politically 
costly and unreliable. Renewable sources, on their 
turn, have not managed to keep up with growing 
energy demands. Wind farming is intermittent and 
is facing declining cost-effectiveness and investment 
– as revealed by the withdrawal of Royal Dutch Shell 
and E.ON from major projects on the grounds of low 
profitability. These examples are some of the factors 
prompting nuclear energy to regain the centre of 
global energy security in the 21st century. 
In contrast, it is true that there are counterargu-
ments downsizing such nuclear panacea. Uranium 
prices have shown volatility as well (as much as 
1,350% between 2000 and 2007).18 Costs of key 
construction materials in nuclear reactors have risen 
considerably.19 The economic recession in the next 
years, although temporary, could have medium-term 
effects on commissioning new reactors. Neverthe-
less, the magnitude of new NPP commissioning – as 
expressed before – suggests the maintenance of the 
upward trend, even if in lower projections. 
Hence, higher demands for nuclear reactors, 
nuclear fuel and human expertise in such field pro-
vide an extra strain on non-proliferation concerns. 
Squassoni suggests that the “expansion of nuclear 
power could have cascading effects on the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime (…); on the practical side, 
additional facilities will mean additional safeguards by 
IAEA inspectors”.20 As Ferguson maintains, the IAEA 
is already “strapped for funds to pay for inspectors 
and near-real-time surveillance capabilities for all the 
current nuclear facilities”.21 Therefore, “as nuclear 
energy demand rises, the budget of the IAEA would 
have to match the rise to increase the probability of 
detecting diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materi-
als.”22 An overstretched IAEA has called for alternative 
mechanisms to limit the processing of weapon-usable 
material “by agreeing to restrict these operations ex-
clusively to facilities under multinational control”.23 
Nevertheless, the feasibility of MNAs – particularly 
those preaching a global division of fuel-cycle coun-
tries versus non-fuel-cycle countries – might prove to 
be limited to curb proliferation risks. 
 
Comprehensive MNAs: are they credible at all?
 
In order to succeed, any multilateral arrange-
ment in the nuclear domain has to reach equilibrium 
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between Assurance of Supply and Assurance of Non-
Proliferation.24 On one hand, costumers must be as-
sured that nuclear fuel will be available and reliable, 
without being disrupted on economical or – mainly 
– on political grounds. This is particularly relevant in 
terms of energy security, as countries must be assured 
that long-term domestic demands for electricity will 
be met. On the other hand, suppliers and the IAEA 
must be assured that peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
are not diverted to military purposes. 
Safeguards and export controls have been some 
of the viable non-proliferation mechanisms so far. 
However, although they can reduce risks and slow-
down the transfer of technology, those tools “cannot 
prevent a state building-up the competence to design 
and construct its own facilities.”25 Furthermore, as 
Wolfsthal argues, inspectors cannot be everywhere at 
every time and “even under the safeguards, the pos-
session of large stocks of highly enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium is permitted under the NPT.”26 
Agreeing with those critiques, a case can be made 
that safeguards and export controls are not enough. 
At first sight, MNAs could be an additional non-
proliferation mechanism in order to fill in the breaches 
and flaws of safeguards and export controls. By put-
ting the nuclear fuel-cycle under international/multi-
national control, the non-proliferation regime could 
enjoy several benefits. As the number of national 
sites is reduced in favour of multinational facilities or 
multilateral arrangements, more frequent inspections 
are possible; overall security is raised; environmental 
procedures can be enhanced; cost-benefit is increased 
due to new economies of scale. More importantly, 
MNAs are confidence-building measures that over-
ride the polemic issuing from domestic fuel-cycle 
capacities. 
Based on these apparent benefits, comprehensive 
MNAs have been suggested in order to curb prolifera-
tion risks. This is the case of the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) and the closed group of nuclear 
suppliers, otherwise known as the Six-State Assurance 
of Supply (involving the U.S., France, Germany, Russia, 
UK, and the Netherlands). The first MNA is a multi-
lateral arrangement for fuel leasing, where suppliers 
provide nuclear fuel and are responsible to buy it back 
for disposal or reprocessing. In fact, the GNEP offers a 
front-end and back-end outsourcing of the fuel-cycle 
on behalf of non-fuel-cycle countries.27 The second 
MNA involves the multilateral assurance from a closed 
group of six states, where a constant fuel supply is 
assured by at least one of the parties.28 From the point 
of view of suppliers, these mechanisms would ensure 
that no sensitive technology is transferred, thus avoid-
ing the dual-use of fissile materials and improving the 
non-proliferation regime. However, from the point of 
view of costumers, there is a catch: the condition of 
both comprehensive MNAs is that costumers promise 
not to develop any indigenous fuel-cycle capacity 
and to buy nuclear fuel exclusively from such suppli-
ers. As Squassoni cleverly mentions, “the devil is in 
the details”.29 Costumer countries have discounted 
such mechanisms “as the ‘haves’ still trying to block 
out the ‘have nots’”.30 Arguably, such MNAs are in 
line with the traditional vision of technology denial. 
Also, there are increasing concerns of legitimizing a 
“nuclear cartel”31 using non-proliferation as pretext 
under an eye-catching multilateral umbrella. 
A case can be made that comprehensive MNAs 
struggle to be viable because of the “increasing unwill-
ingness of many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept 
additional restrictions to their right to peaceful nuclear 
technology under the NPT.”32 Article IV guarantees the 
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inalienable right of countries to the production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose, including 
the possibility of having a domestic fuel-cycle capacity 
under IAEA safeguards. Despite recent attempts to 
reinterpret the practical extent of such rights, the fact 
is that Article IV “was specifically crafted to preclude 
any attempt to reinterpret the NPT so as to inhibit a 
country’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies, as 
long as the technology is not used for nuclear weap-
ons.”33 Therefore, several countries feel that MNAs as 
such could lead to loss of sovereignty, fuel dependency 
and increasing technological asymmetry in the nuclear 
industry. These factors threaten the calculations made 
by costumer countries regarding their own energy se-
curity in the long-run. Growing energy demands and 
environmental issues can pressure countries further to 
defend their sovereign right to develop an indigenous 
fuel-cycle capacity. Therefore, as Rauf and Simpson 
put it, “countries with differing levels of technology, 
institutionalization, political relationships, economic 
development resources, or requirements might find 
multilateral approaches inconvenient, unfeasible, 
restrictive, or simply not beneficial”.34 
In line with Rauf and Simpson, Decker also sug-
gests that some countries might decide not to be 
involved in multinational arrangements. Rather, they 
would prefer to develop a capacity on their own 
soil for the following reasons:35 (a) a full fuel-cycle 
offers stability of supply; (b) an enrichment facility 
can provide commercial scale, placing the country 
amongst international nuclear fuel suppliers; and (c) 
a local enrichment capacity provides a perception of 
national prestige and regional power. Although Braun 
and May claim that multilateral arrangements restore 
the true intent of Article IV,36 their misperception lies 
on the fact that ‘cradle-to-grave’ MNAs can mask 
a discriminatory approach. Closed supplier groups 
can, on their turn, be perceived as ‘nuclear mercan-
tilism’ when trying to secure foreign demand to the 
outputs of companies such as Areva, Atomprom or 
General Electric.37 It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find that “all proposals to establish fuel reserves or 
other mechanisms emerged from current or potential 
nuclear fuel suppliers”.38 By preventing new coun-
tries to develop, research, and produce nuclear fuel 
for peaceful purposes, ‘cradle-to-grave’ and closed 
supplier group arrangements may inhibit costumer 
countries to join in. The lack of substantial adherence 
to multilateral “partnerships” as such may threaten 




Limited, Regional and Non-discriminatory 
 
Ferguson stresses that economics is as a major 
factor behind the growth of nuclear energy (“nuclear 
energy is a business, not a religion”39). If economics 
is indeed the primary driver, some MNAs may help 
the expansion of the nuclear sector by offering at-
tractive comparative advantages and economies of 
scale. This is probably why there are already examples 
of MNAs with limited scope. According to the IAEA, 
Baltic States are seeking a regional enrichment proj-
ect based in Lithuania.40 A similar approach is being 
considered by member countries of the ‘Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf’.41 Argentina 
and Brazil also plan to deepen cooperation towards a 
joint facility. URENCO and EURODIF consortiums, on 
their turn, are concrete MNAs that enjoyed relative 
success before declining in the face of economic vul-
nerabilities. These examples seem to share a common 
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denominator: economics, not non-proliferation. The 
perception of mutual economic and technological 
benefits in the fuel-cycle might be more attractive 
than non-proliferation arrangements that insist in the 
“division of the world into two classes: fuel supplier 
states and fuel client states”.42 As the IAEA itself has 
put it, a “multinational fuel-cycle strategy, just like a 
national one, must rest on a solid economic justifica-
tion in order to be successful”.43 Therefore, discrimi-
natory arrangements with limited economic benefits 
and based on technology denial have struggled to 
prosper. The lack of attractiveness and feasibility from 
the start undermine the credibility of comprehensive 
MNAs as non-proliferation tools. 
The GNEP and the Six-State Assurance of Supply 
are failing to gain acceptance and weight. According 
to Lindemeyer, the nuclear industry has led tepid sup-
port to GNEP, concluding that “the initiative is not a 
credible strategy for resolving either the radioactive 
waste or proliferation problem”.44 Furthermore, it 
is not clear whether the Obama Administration will 
maintain the GNEP and under what terms. Moreover, 
the initiative suffered substantial drawbacks regard-
ing the capacity of the main nuclear powers to be 
involved in the back-end of the fuel-cycle (reprocess-
ing, storage and disposal). These include the delay in 
the activation of the U.S. nuclear repository in Yucca 
Mountain, besides Russia’s recent decision of no 
longer importing spent nuclear fuel for storage and 
ultimate disposal.45 Without a concrete back-end 
capacity, ‘cradle-to-grave’ MNAs simply fall apart 
as non-proliferation tools. Concerning the Six-State 
Assurance of Supply, its cartel-like structure faces 
resistance from countries that invested massively in 
their own fuel-cycle capacity for either domestic needs 
or international commercial exports.46 
Therefore, the bargain between assurances 
of supply versus restraints in the use of sensitive 
technology has low probability to work as a global 
non-proliferation Multilateral Nuclear Approach. The 
growing thirst for energy, public perceptions on global 
warming, desires for technological independency, as 
well as national prestige, are all factors behind the ex-
pansion of NPPs and domestic enrichment capacities. 
Despite calls from ElBaradei and major supplier coun-
tries, comprehensive MNAs lacking feasibility will not 
shield the Achilles’ heel of non-proliferation. Instead, 
limited, regional, multilayered and non-discriminatory 
multilateral arrangements might be the option ahead. 
They can be more economically attractive whilst mini-
mizing the number of world-wide fuel-cycle facilities 
and improving the non-proliferation regime. Although 
such limited MNAs are not primarily designed as non-
proliferation tools, they could add one more layer to 
the non-proliferation regime by minimizing some of 
the challenges posed by the growing nuclear energy 
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Resumo: Apelos por ‘abordagens multilaterais ao 
ciclo do combustível nuclear’ (AMNs) têm sido cogi-
tados devido ao crescente risco da expansão do setor 
de energia nuclear em contraponto ao regime in-
ternacional de não-proliferação. No entanto, AMNs 
baseadas em acordos globais carecem de viabilidade 
ao propor a divisão do mundo entre fornecedores 
e clientes de combustível nuclear. A sede crescente 
por segurança energética, além da necessidade de 
independência tecnológica e acesso soberano aos 
mercados internacionais de combustível nuclear são 
alguns dos fatores que prejudicam a credibilidade 
das AMNs como ferramentas de não-proliferação. 
Abstract: Calls for Multilateral Nuclear Approaches 
(MNAs) have been raised due to growing risks that 
the expansion of the nuclear power sector poses to 
a strained international non-proliferation regime. 
However, MNAs based on comprehensive arrange-
ments lacks feasibility when proposing to divide the 
world into nuclear fuel suppliers and fuel clients. The 




growing thirst for energy security, besides the need 
for technological independency and sovereign ac-
cess to international nuclear fuel markets are some 
of the factors undermining the credibility of MNAs 
as non-proliferation tools. 
Palavras-chave: não-proliferação nuclear; regimes 
internacionais; abordagens nucleares multilaterais 
Key words: nuclear non-proliferation; international 
regimes; multilateral nuclear approaches 

